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Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 catapulted terrorism into the mind of every American. While the attacks surprised many, to some they were simply the logical result of fundamentalism that had been brewing for centuries. Who attacked us, why, and what can we do to prevent it from happening again? Serious discussion of these questions has been relegated mainly to those who study military strategy and international relations theory within the halls of academia. Yet the answers are absolutely critical, and getting them wrong risks either placing the blame on those who are not the enemy or failing to target those who intend to harm America.
Most importantly, it potentially exposes us to another similar attack -or worse. This paper argues that thus far, we have largely mischaracterized our enemy and the reasons they attacked us. As a result, we are at great risk of another attack unless we shift our focus to target the real enemy of America -the ideology of Islamic jihadi fundamentalism.
Sun Tzu famously said, "Know the enemy, know yourself, and you need not fear the result of a hundred battles." 1 This wise quote should drive every military strategist to ask, "Who is our enemy?" Four consecutive U.S. presidents have expressly denied that our foe's motivations are fundamentally religious, and various theorists have proposed that the battle is economic, political, tribal, ethnic, and/or cultural. However, an examination of terrorist attacks on Americans in the last 50 years shows that our "Global War on Terror" is neither global, nor is it simply a war on terrorism; it is a war on a very specific type of terrorism -Islamic terrorism.
There are terrorists in dozens of countries around the world, including Europe, Asia, South America, and Africa, with whom we are not at war. 2 In contrast, a simple examination of the attacks in Beirut, the U.S.S. Cole, Khobar Towers, the American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, the Bali nightclub, the World Trade Center, the London bombings in July 2005, and the recent attacks in Sydney and Paris reveal that the attackers are not just generic terrorists, they are overtly Islamic terrorists who justify their actions in explicitly religious terms. To divorce the terrorist from his motivation under the guise of political correctness is to mischaracterize our enemy and place ourselves at greater risk.
The threat we face is very real, and very religious. While these jihadis represent a very small subset of over a billion Muslims, their beliefs and actions are an immediate and significant threat to Americans. If we are to learn from Sun Tzu's dictum, we must understand these militants, their motivations, their history, and the context which generates their fervor to harm America and its allies. 3 First, this will involve a working knowledge of sectarian factors in the history of Islam. Second, it requires an understanding of where they fall within the broader scope of their religion. Finally, it will force us to re-examine the international relations theory that has guided our approach to this conflict, with an eye toward constructivism.
Thesis
Our adversary in the war on terrorism is a small sect of Islam, motivated by overtly religious intentions but acting in direct violation of the religion they claim. To effectively combat this foe, we must understand their developmental history and where they fit within broader Islam, and then use that information in a constructivist approach that favors information and diplomacy over military options. The Qur'an imposed a total ban on the inhuman methods of warfare practiced in Arabia and elsewhere, prior to Islam…all cruel and torturous ways of killing the enemy are prohibited. The killing of women, minors, servants and slaves…is also not allowed. The Muslim armies must also spare the blind, monks, hermits, the elderly, the physically deformed and the insane or the mentally deficient. Forbidden also is the decapitation of the prisoners of war, the mutilation of men and beast…the killing of…those who do not take part in the actual fighting is also not allowed.
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The hadith and the restrictions on jihad imposed by Muslim doctrine forbid suicide, 55 indiscriminate killing, targeting noncombatants, mistreating prisoners, and murder. To paraphrase Noorani, the violent behavior we see from ISIS and others is not just legalistic, it is heresy.
Islamic Jihad and Constructivism
We have defined our foe as a sectarian, legalistic Muslims, and placed them in context as a small minority within their own faith, acting in direct violation of the very authorities they advocate. The United States' history of denying the overtly religious nature of the enemy and mischaracterizing his motivations has potentially weakened our approach to combating and preventing attacks. As a superpower nation-state, the United States has consistently and understandably exhibited a tendency to view all conflict in realist terms, focusing on nation-state power politics. In recent history, realism has become the de-facto view in American international relations theory -to many, it is a doctrine immune to critique and synonymous with the study of national security. 56 This realist tendency to view every conflict in nation-state, balance-of-power, political terms is reflected by the national strategy of every president since the start of the Global War on Terror.
Realist Presuppositions in United States Strategy
In 2007 President George W. Bush gave a speech at The Heritage Foundation, saying, "We must take the words of the enemy seriously…hear the words of Osama bin Laden last year:
'Death is better than living on this Earth with the unbelievers among us.' History teaches that underestimating the words of evil, ambitious men is a terrible mistake." 57 President Bush then compares fighting the ideology of al-Qaeda to fighting the communist ideology of Stalin and
Lenin. But these men were leaders of a nation-state, even a superpower. We cannot so easily translate our strategy against a massive nation-state to our strategy against an adaptive and elusive non-state actor, and expect similar results. Six months after that speech, President Bush again addressed the nation: "But in the long run, defeating the terrorists requires an alternative to their murderous ideology. And there we have… [an] advantage in our strong belief in the transformative power of liberty." 58 Unfortunately, the terrorists don't aspire to freedom or liberty; it holds no great attraction to them. They desire to see Islam spread, and whether the country has free elections or values individual liberty is completely irrelevant to the jihadis. Just prior to this speech Bush admitted that, "We were attacked by a brutal enemy that despises freedom." 59 This clear non-sequitur -admitting that our enemy despises freedom, then suggesting that creating a free society and espousing liberty will combat that enemy -is indicative of an administration that doesn't understand the enemy it faces. On the contrary, creating the very kind of society the militants despise will only inflame their hatred and spur them into action. It is shockingly naïve to believe that exporting into their back yard the very values they so despise will somehow appease their hatred or diminish their violence. Examined in international relations terms, the first three of these objectives are clearly realist, and the last is liberal idealist. For a decade or more, the United States' strategy has focused on clear realism 61 -attacking leadership, funding, supply lines, headquarters -but this approach translates poorly to the battle against Islamic jihad. They are not a nation-state with clearly defined borders, government, an economy, or a reliable and "targetable" infrastructure. We watch Milosevic, Qaddafi, and Hussein fall, demonstrating that when the dictator falls, the regime falls -then naively assume that when bin Laden is killed, al-Qaeda will fall. 62 This may prove true in nation-state realism, but not al-Qaeda -when bin Laden falls, Ayman al-Zawahiri steps in and the terror network lives on. They recognize no borders, and their leadership and logistics are fluid and highly mobile. Making matters worse, death and destruction are attractive to these militants, and continued airstrikes may be giving them precisely what they desire. "The choice to use military force empowers this enemy," reports the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, "Al-Qaeda and ISIS not only do not seem to mind that they are hunted; they seem to thrive because of it…terrorist groups feed on the instability and economic decimation that warfare brings." 63 To be effective in this struggle against jihadis, the United
States should refocus its entire strategic approach to constructivism rather than realism.
A Call to Constructivism
Abandoning faulty assumptions and application of realist nation-state power politics upon non-state actors, the United States must consider approaching the Islamic terror threat from a constructivist perspective. The constructivist theory emphasizes the relationships between people, focusing on the jihadi desire to create the world they want through their interactions with each other and the world. 3 Interestingly, some military historians have attributed our struggles in battling counterinsurgency to a failure to understand the enemy, his culture, beliefs, and reasons for fighting. Rovner provides sufficient detail, dissecting the insurgencies in the Philippines, Malaya, Vietnam, and Iraq, finding that key defense officials planning these campaigns were "…profoundly ignorant about the social and cultural bases" of the respective insurgencies (Rovner 222) . This same point could be applied to the jihadis. Rovner also advocates turning insurgent warfare by cultivating charismatic and capable local leaders (similar to the constructivist recommendations later in this paper). 6 Stewart Patrick of the Council on Foreign Relations also conducted an in-depth study, published in his book Weak Links, analyzing the factors that motivate violent non-state actors. Among the factors he considered was the suggestion that weak or failing states generate violent non-state actors. He concludes that it is "striking…how little empirical analysis has been undertaken to document and explore the connection between state failure and transnational security threats." He follows his analysis with "…the links between state weakness and [terrorism] are more complicated and tenuous that often assumed…it is obvious that not all (or even most) weak and failed states are afflicted by terrorism…weak capacity cannot explain why terrorist activity is concentrated in the Middle East and broader Muslim world. Clearly, other variables and dynamics -political, religious, cultural, and geographical -shape its global distribution" . This proposed connection between a failing economy and terrorism also fails to explain how the breeding ground and one of the largest financiers of terrorism is also one of the wealthiest and most stable states in the Middle East -Saudi Arabia. 9 Ibid., 1 -3. death, usually by friends, relatives, and other Muslim contemporaries. Each hadith is supposed to be supported by a chain of authority back to Muhammad himself. The hadith consists of literally tens of thousands of sayings and phrases, with the most commonly used edition of the hadith (compiled by al-Bukhari) encompassing nine thick volumes. The first six books are considered authentic by the Sunni, with each one of the 7,500 sayings traceable back to Muhammad. Other editions of the hadith and other sayings in the al-Bukhari are traceable back to a companion or relative of Muhammad, but not to the Prophet, and therefore do not carry the same significance . 25 It should be noted that Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims do not agree on all of the hadith, occasionally disagreeing on whether individual sayings were actually uttered by the Prophet or added later by his followers. As a result, the Sunni and Shi'a have different (though overlapping) collections of hadith. Despite the differences over individual sayings in the hadith, all Muslims agree on the authority contained within them and the Qur'an.
26 Ijma literally means "consensus," and is still a recognized source of authority for many Muslims. When the community of Muslim scholars (the mujtahids or ulema) convene to discuss an issue, when they reach unanimous agreement, their ruling is considered binding by Muslims that recognize ijma. However, many Muslims reject the authority of ijma, considering it the equivalent of legislation by man instead of Allah. The Maliki school accepts the ijma, but it is rejected by Hanbali. The Shafi'i have a different procedure for arriving at consensus, but recognize its authority 28 These four schools are distinct, and the separation looks tidy -but in reality, it is still even more complex. Just as in Christianity, there are Lutherans who don't follow everything Luther taught and Calvinists who depart from Calvin, there are many Muslims who claim allegiance to a given tradition of jurisprudence but don't agree with everything it teaches. There are also other schools besides these four, but within about 300 years of Muhammad's death, these four had emerged as the predominant schools that encompassed nearly every view within Sunni Islam (Khadduri 36) . 29 The Shi'a subscribe to a separate legal interpretation, the Jafari school, which differs significantly from the Sunni tradition. 
